Cross-reference(s):

1. Reviews this book by Alan Dershowitz

Dershowitz’s book is far too sophisticated to be dismissed as mere propaganda. But it is a polemic. And like every good polemic, it succeeds through selection, omission, philosophic extrapolation and comparisons with other countries and historical events — and by presenting debatable premises as incontrovertible fact. Since the book’s appearance, Dershowitz has boldly offered $10,000 to anyone who can prove he has written something inaccurate.

But when it comes to the Middle East, there is often a fine line between outright inaccuracy and differing interpretations of the same event. For instance, Dershowitz, like many Israelis and Americans, takes Yasser Arafat’s rejection of Israel’s peace offer at Camp David in July 2000, as proof that Palestinians are still bent on eliminating the Jewish state. After all, it marked the third time this century Palestinians had rejected a two-state solution (the earlier occasions were the Peel Commission recommendations of 1937 and the UN partition plan in 1947). Few would deny that Arafat made a tragic mistake in walking away from the last serious peace talks and in opting, yet again, for violence. But that doesn’t mean the Palestinians were never serious about accepting a mini state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Dershowitz gives no analysis of the 1993-2000 Oslo peace process and the degree to which Israeli land confiscations, daily Palestinian checkpoint humiliations, Israeli settlement activity and other factors had fatally eroded Palestinian trust in Israel’s intentions. By the time Arafat and his cronies actually got to Camp David, they were on very shaky ground in terms of their own domestic support. And a few Palestinian negotiators have since revealed they genuinely feared they were being misled by some of the maps and numbers presented by the Israelis.

The Case for Israel succeeds admirably in most of what it sets forth. Its failing is what is left out. For instance, Dershowitz gives short shrift to the entire issue of Israeli settlements and the role they played in undermining Palestinian good will during the Oslo years. He gives the settlements a cursory six-paragraph chapter in which he says, “Although I am personally opposed to the settlements, I do not believe they are the real barrier to peace.”